In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ. Beh., 1990). Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in period one but we …nd that a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.
Introduction
There is substantial interest in the theoretical literature on endogenous timing in games. This literature started with Saloner (1987) , Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) , and Robson (1990) and includes recent contributions by Amir and Grilo (1999) , Matsumura (2002) , Normann (2002) and van Damme and Hurkens (2004) . The basic questions these models try to answer is simple but signi…-cant. When are …rms likely to play either a simultaneous-move game or a sequential-move game?
In models with endogenous sequencing, the order of output or price decisions is not exogenously speci…ed. Instead, it is derived from …rms'decisions in a timing game.
Several recent experiments have attempted to validate the theory empirically 1 but support for the theory was by and large not found. In these experiments, simultaneous-move Cournot outcomes are modal-in contrast to the prediction. Even when sequential moves occur, Stackelberg leaders produce less than predicted while followers produce more (see also Huck, Müller and Normann, 2001 ).
Why does theory perform rather poorly in experiments?
The theory underlying the experiments predicts the emergence of Stackelberg equilibria and typically there exist two Stackelberg equilibria. This causes two problems. First, coordination problems occur in the experimental markets since either …rm may emerge as the Stackelberg leader. Neither Stackelberg equilibrium is preferable to the other and subjects …nd it di¢ cult to coordinate on one. 2 Second, it is di¢ cult to see from a behavioral perspective why players should coordinate on an equilibrium with large payo¤ di¤erences (as it is the case in a Stackelberg leader-follower outcome). It is well known that many subjects in experiments exhibit an aversion against disadvantageous inequality. Such inequality aversion might render the Stackelberg equilibria unappealing candidates for convergence in an experiment.
In this paper, we want to further explore the reasons for the failure of the theory by investigating a timing game with a unique and symmetric equilibrium. The basis of the experiments is 1 work. The equilibrium of this extended timing game is in simultaneous moves and has equal quantities as …rms have symmetric costs. Hence, in our experiments, neither coordination failure nor inequality aversion should hinder the predictive power of the theory. Our conjecture is that the theory will be con…rmed in the new experiments. If symmetric outcomes fuelled by inequality aversion have been previously observed even though they were not predicted, then it seems likely that the theory will be vindicated if symmetric outcomes are predicted.
A second novelty is that we run experimental sessions both with randomly matched par- 
Model and predictions
In Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) extended game with observable delay two …rms can produce in one of two possible periods (period 1 or 2). A pure strategy for …rm i = 1; 2 is a choice of a production period t i 2 f1; 2g and a set of functions i : f(1; 1); (1; 2), (2; 1)
which is …rm i's quantity choice as a function of production periods, (t 1 ; t 2 ), and the output of …rm j 6 = i when …rm i is the Stackelberg follower. Given the decisions to produce in period 1 or 2, …rms will not mix over outputs.
In the experiments we used the following linear inverse demand function
where q i denotes …rm i's output. Linear costs of production in both periods were given by
Pro…ts are denoted by i = p(q 1 + q 2 )q i 6q i :
Consider the predictions in the static game …rst. We start with the second stage. In the subgame with t 1 = 1 and t 2 = 1; …rms play the simultaneous-move Cournot equilibrium in period 1 with q i = 8 and resulting in payo¤s of i = 64 (i = 1; 2). The same holds in the subgame with t 1 = 2 and t 2 = 2: In the subgame with t 1 = 1 and t 2 = 2; …rms play the Stackelberg equilibrium with …rm 1 choosing q L 1 = 12 in period 1 whereas …rm 2, the Stackelberg follower, chooses q F 2 = 6 in period 2. This implies payo¤s of L 1 = 72 and F 2 = 36. Outputs and payo¤s for the subgame with t 1 = 2 and t 2 = 1 are q L 2 = 12; q F 1 = 6 and L 2 = 72 and F 1 = 36. Then we go back to the …rst stage.
; choosing period 1 is a dominant strategy and thus we have t 1 = t 2 = 1 in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
With repeated interaction in the …xed matching sessions, it is well known that collusion can occur (Selten and Stoecker, 1986) . It is easy to verify that q i = 6 is the symmetric joint-pro…t maximizing strategy which results in payo¤s of i = 72 (i = 1; 2). Given both …rms collude, the timing decisions are immaterial. However, if there is some uncertainty about the other players' willingness to collude, timing decisions may play an important role. For example, producing at t i = 2 may resolve the uncertainty whether the other player colludes, and at t i = 2 non-colluding rivals may also be punished. Producing at t i = 1 provides an opportunity to signal collusive intents.
Note that if these incentives for moving …rst or second materialize, they would be rather di¤erent from those in the static endogenous timing models.
Experimental design and procedures
The experimental markets were designed so as to implement the extended game with observable delay one-to-one. The game was repeated over 30 rounds in order to allow for learning both with random and …xed matching.
A minor di¤erence to the game as formally stated above is that subjects had to choose their quantities from a truncated and discretized strategy space, yielding a standard payo¤ bi-matrix.
Subjects had to choose integer quantities between 3 and 15. 3 In both treatments, subjects got individual feedback about what happened in their market at the end of each round. That is, the computer screen 4 showed the production period, the quantity, and the pro…t of both duopolists. In sessions with random matching (henceforth Random), subjects were rematched by the computer at the beginning of each round. We conducted …ve sessions with ten participants each. The two sessions with …xed matching (henceforth Fixed) had ten participants as well, so there were …ve …xed duopoly pairs in each session. Treatments were conducted in an identical way, except for the matching scheme.
The experiments were conducted at Royal Holloway, University of London, in spring and summer 2002. Altogether 70 subjects participated in the experiment. They were students from various departments, many from …elds other than economics or business administration.
In the instructions (see Appendix A) subjects were told that they would act as a …rm which, together with another …rm, serves one market, and that in each round both were to choose when and how much to produce. After having read the instructions, participants could privately ask questions.
Before the …rst round was started subjects were asked to answer two control questions (which were checked) in order to make sure that everybody had full understanding of the payo¤ table.
The monetary payment was computed by using an exchange rate of 300 "points" for one pound sterling and adding a ‡at payment of £ 4. 5 Subjects'average earnings were $13:02 ($19:53 at the time) including the ‡at payment. The sessions lasted about 60 to 90 minutes.
Experimental results
We report the results of treatments Random and Fixed separately. When discussing the results, we often refer to third 1 (rounds 1-10), third 2 (rounds 11-20), and third 3 (last ten rounds). Table 1 shows the evolution of the relative frequency of t=1 choices over time. In Random the relative frequency of t=1 decisions increases from 57% to 72% (from third 1 to third 3). This is 3 We used the same matrix as in Huck, Müller and Normann (2001) . 4 We are grateful to Urs Fischbacher for letting us use his software toolbox "z-Tree" (Fischbacher, 1999) . 5 This payment was made since subjects could have made losses in the game. Table 2 : Average individual quantities in the subgames over time a clear trend towards equilibrium timing behavior. However, the relative frequency of t=1 choices is still below the equilibrium prediction of 100% towards the end of the experiment. Moreover the increase slows down considerably from third 2 to third 3.
Random matching
Since we have random matching, the relative frequency of timing decisions immediately imply the relative frequencies of the timing outcomes. The equilibrium prediction with both …rms choosing t=1, occurs with only 55% (third 3). Simultaneous play in t=2 occurs with 10% and sequential play with the remaining 35% (third 3). Since t=1 choices increase over time, the relative frequency of the subgame where both …rms choose t=1 increases whereas the frequency of the other two subgames decreases.
Once …rms have made their timing choices, they know in which sequence they choose their outputs. How do …rms behave in the subgames? Table 2 shows average individual quantities across thirds contingent on the timing decisions. In Random, we observe that after a short learning phase (third 1) the t 1 =t 2 =1 and t 1 =t 2 =2 subgames are virtually identical. They are also close to the Cournot prediction. However, in the asymmetric subgame, attempts to exploit a …rst-mover advantage by choosing a higher than Cournot quantity of 8 is punished by followers. 6 Note, for 6 Interestingly, the fraction of subjects (9) who choose to delay 22 times or more are more competitive Stackelberg instance, that the best response to a …rst mover's quantity of 10 and 9 is 7 and 8 respectively.
Moreover, …rst-movers'output is smaller than predicted (12 units).
As a consequence, both Stackelberg leaders' and followers' payo¤s are smaller than the payo¤s in the two simultaneous subgames 7 . In fact, the payo¤s in the Cournot subgame in t=1 are higher than in any other subgame. 8 This provides an incentive for the subjects to avoid the sequential-move subgame by coordinating on the t=1 Cournot subgame, thus avoiding to choose production in t = 2. Note also that, over time, Stackelberg leaders become less competitive and Stackelberg followers less punitive such that payo¤ di¤erences become less extreme and, thus, the incentive to avoid the sequential-move game gets weaker. This might explain why the increase of t=1 choices gets slower over time. We also note that subjects choosing period 1 earn on average higher payo¤s over time than subjects choosing period 2. 9 The pro…t …gures are 51.6 and 47. The surprising insight from the comparison to HMN is that results di¤er only marginallythough predictions based on subgame perfectness oppose each other. In HMN, the relative frequency of t=1 decisions is 56%, 65% and 62% across thirds. These numbers are very close to ours in the …rst two thirds and only somewhat smaller towards the end of the experiment. Note that in our experiment …rms have a strict incentive to choose t=1 (they can only lose by choosing t=2) while, followers than the overall average. 7 Signi…cant at the 5% level using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test, where each observation corresponds to the average pro…ts across players from a session. 8 The di¤erence between Cournot in period 1 and Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg follower, respectively, is signi…cant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively, using a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The di¤erence between the two Cournot outcomes is not testable, due to an insu¢ cient number of observations. 9 This is, however, not signi…cantly di¤erent at any conventional level of signi…cance (two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test). 1 0 More precisely, there exist two Stackelberg equilibria and one …rst-period Cournot equilibrium, but only the two Stackelberg equilibria are in undominated strategies.
in the extended game with action commitment, …rms have a weak incentive to delay (as they can play a best reply to whatever the rival …rm did in t=1). Nevertheless, aggregate t=1 choices are rather similar in both studies.
The similarity of market outcomes in both experiments is also illustrated by a look at the frequency of Cournot outcomes (that is, both …rms choosing quantity 8, regardless of the timing decisions 
Fixed matching
Let us now consider treatment Fixed. Table 1 above also shows the evolution of the relative frequency of period-1 choices in Fixed. In contrast to Random, period-1 choices stay roughly constant at a level of 50%. The frequency of timing outcomes is not immediate from Table 1 as they depend on individual duopoly pairs. We …nd that the frequency of the predicted t 1 =t 2 =1 subgame increases from 17% to 32% (from third 1 to third 3). Surprisingly, the frequency of the t 1 =t 2 =2 subgame increases, too, from 17% to 26%. As in treatment Random, the frequency of the sequential subgame decreases from 66% to 42%, but it is modal in all thirds. Table 2 reports average quantities. With the exception of the t=1 Cournot subgame, outputs are generally smaller compared to Random, indicating a tendency to collude. We note that output produced in the …rst-period simultaneous subgame is always slightly higher than the Cournot quantity of 8. Whilst the Cournot output in t=1 appears to be larger in Fixed, 11 we observe that average outputs in the sequential subgame, as well as in the t=2 Cournot subgame are smaller in the Fixed treatment (and also smaller than the predicted output of 8.) Third, both Stackelberg leaders and followers in treatment Fixed are less competitive than those in treatment Random 12 but they do not appear to collude (on average). This implies that in treatment Fixed there is less of an incentive to avoid the sequential subgame by choosing t=1.
1 1 This di¤erence is not signi…cant (one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test). 1 2 This is signi…cant at the 1% level regarding the Stackelberg followers, but not regarding the Stackelberg leaders (one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test).
As expected from the lower quantities, pro…ts are generally higher in Fixed. More precisely, average pro…ts after choosing period 1 and period 2, respectively, are 50.8 and 49.4 (third 1), 50.1 and 49.3 (third 2), and 50.3 and 60.3 (third 3), respectively. Hence, timing decisions do not seem to a¤ect pro…ts very much in the …rst two thirds but towards the end of the experiment subjects seem to coordinate more e¤ectively in the t 1 =t 2 =2 subgame. The fact that the frequency of both simultaneous subgames rises over time can by and large be explained by observing that some pairs tend to coordinate on t=1 whereas others tend to coordinate on t=2. Recall that production costs are the same in both periods.
Discussion
Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) extended game with observable delay has a unique and symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which both players choose to produce in the …rst period, implying symmetric Cournot quantities. In this paper we report on an experimental test of this prediction.
We run the game both with a random and a …xed matching scheme. With random-matching, we …nd that timing choices move in the right direction but they do not converge to the predicted level as nearly one third of all subjects still chooses to delay toward the end of the experiment. With a …xed-matching scheme we …nd that the subgame perfect equilibrium has no predictive power with regard to timing choices as throughout the experiment only half of the timing observations are period one choices. The di¤erences in timing choices in the two treatments can to some extent be explained by the di¤erences observed in the asymmetric subgames. In the treatment with random matching more competitive behavior in the asymmetric subgames provides an incentive to avoid it by choosing to produce early. This is not the case in the treatment with …xed matching as here the behavior in the asymmetric subgames is less competitive.
The …nding that timing choices do not converge to the predicted level suggests that there must be preferences that cause subjects to delay their decisions. Recently, Tykocinski and Ruf‡e (2003) documented that such preferences exist. Their study is about "reasonable reasons for waiting". Experimental subjects had to choose between two options in a certain scenario and an uncertain scenario. It turned out that subjects often prefer to delay their decisions even when waiting does not provide any additional information at all.
While it is di¢ cult to compare these individual decision experiments to our strategic context, one can draw parallels. Our results indicate that subjects sometimes prefer to wait even when doing so puts them at a strategic disadvantage. When choosing period two, our subjects can …nd out which action the rival …rm has chosen, provided this rival chose the …rst period. Even though they become the Stackelberg follower in this case, they prefer to wait, perhaps to resolve the strategic uncertainty about the other player's action. Once subjects are more familiar with the experimental environment, this preference to wait is getting weaker in the random-matching treatment. Nevertheless many subjects still delay towards the end of the experiment.
With …xed matching, these considerations may be less relevant since subjects face less ambiguity regarding choices of their opponent. As argued above, timing choices may not re ‡ect the incentives suggested by non-cooperative game theory. Instead, timing choices may turn out to be an instrument to support collusion. While we observe only little collusion in our experiments, our results suggest that timing decisions do not a¤ect pro…ts by very much with …xed matching (except towards the end of the experiment).
We found that our results with random matching are similar in many respects to those in Huck, where, however, Stackelberg equilibria are predicted. Generally, previous work 13 found that endogenous timing models predicting asymmetric outcomes are of limited behavioral relevance due to coordination failure and inequality aversion. The results in this study show that there are forces su¢ ciently strong to prevent play from converging to a unique equilibrium of an endogenous timing model even if the equilibrium is symmetric.
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not talk to your neighbours and keep quiet during the entire experiment. If you have any questions, please give us a sign. We will answer your question privately.
In our experiment you can earn di¤erent amounts of money, depending on your behaviour and that of other participants matched with you. All participants read identical instructions.
You have the role of a …rm which produces the same product as a second …rm in the market. First you have to decide, at which time you want to produce. Afterwards, you decide on the quantity you want to produce.
Regarding the time when to produce, you can choose either the …rst or the second production period. As the other …rm has the same choice, there are four possibilities. Both …rst, both second, you …rst and the other …rm second, and you second and the other …rm …rst. In all cases, you will be informed about the timing decision of the other …rm before choosing your quantity.
The quantity decisions are made in the sequence resulting from the timing decisions. If both …rms choose …rst or both choose second, quantity decisions are made simultaneously. In those cases, you and the other …rm have to make the quantity decisions not knowing what the other one chooses. If you choose …rst and the other …rm second, then the other …rm will learn your quantity decision before making its own decision. Likewise, if you choose second and the other …rm …rst, then you will learn the other …rm's output decision before making your own decision.
Note that the pro…t in each round depends only on the chosen quantities, not on the choice of production periods. In the attached payo¤ table, you can see the resulting pro…ts of both …rms for all possible choices of quantity. The table reads as follows: At the head of a row the quantity of your …rm is indicated, at the head of a column the quantity of the other …rm is stated. In the cell at which row and column intersect, your pro…t is noted in the lower left and the other …rm's pro…t is stated in the upper right. All pro…ts are expressed in a …ctional currency, which we call "Points".
The experiment lasts 30 rounds. After each round, you will be informed about the quantity choice of the other …rm, your pro…t and the other …rm's pro…t. The head of the row represents one …rm's quantity and the head of the column represents the quantity of the other …rm. Inside the box at which row and column intersect, one …rm's pro…t matching this combination of quantities stands up to the left and the other …rm's pro…t stands down to the right.
